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Abstract 
Background: The national health insurance scheme of Nigeria recently proposed a national premium for community 
based insurance scheme. This study determined the capacity of households in the rural and urban areas in Nigeria to 
pay for the premium and different hypothetical health insurance schemes namely national health insurance scheme, 
national urban health insurance scheme, national rural health insurance scheme and regional health insurance 
schemes. It determined the likely impact of different premiums on membership across socio-economic status quin-
tiles, and then determined the threshold premium affordable to rural and urban households.
Results: The results show that the mean capacity to pay for the households in different regions ranged from 
US$194 ± 100 to US$986 ± 907. The threshold premiums of the national health insurance scheme, urban national 
health insurance and rural health insurance schemes were US$66, US$154 and US$53 respectively.
Conclusions: Overall, the threshold premium for rural national health insurance scheme and national health 
insurance schemes were affordable to the lowest socio economic group. Hence, it is recommended that threshold 
premium for rural national health insurance scheme be adopted as the maximum premium not to be exceeded in the 
proposed national health insurance scheme.
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Background
The essence of health insurance is to mobilise healthcare 
resources from citizens through a prepayment system 
and to protect individuals and households from cata-
strophic health expenditures, in order to enhance popu-
lation coverage with quality health services.
Although, health insurance confers financial protection 
[1], complementary risk protection is predicated on the 
extent of co-payment for access of health services; the 
depth of the benefit package and the perception of the 
quality of service provision [2–4].
Many low income countries are compelled to rely on 
community based health insurance (CBHI) to extend 
financial risk protection to citizens [4]. This occurs 
because most of these countries lack robust taxation sys-
tems and are plagued by high unemployment rates that 
make it difficult to adopt either general tax based health 
insurance or social health insurance as vehicle to univer-
sal coverage [5].
Community based health insurance schemes depend 
on the voluntary contribution of members. However, the 
financial pool achieved by such schemes is usually small, 
and often inadequate to ensure the provision of the ben-
efits included in the scheme, and the payments that need 
to be made to providers. Having voluntary contributions 
also creates the room for the healthier population to opt 
out of schemes, and for wealthier groups to aggregate 
within schemes that offer more comprehensive services 
compared to those populated by poorer people, which 
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The flat nature of contributions also mean that redistri-
bution of resources is not achieved. These factors create 
the situation that CBHI schemes are unlikely to guaran-
tee financial pools that provide adequate financial risk 
protection for members, except if they are complemented 
with subsidies, reinsurance or are merged [5, 6].
Achieving financial sustainability and high enrolment 
in CBHI schemes considerably depends on the level of 
the CBHI premium. Low CBHI premium usually result 
in unsustainable schemes which ultimately collapse, with 
the attendant effect that members end up depending 
on out-of-pocket payments for healthcare. Conversely, 
high CBHI premiums may not be affordable. An upward 
review of premium in CBHI usually stimulates de-enrol-
ment of members, and may disproportionately affect the 
poor members of the scheme [7].
One way of determining the readiness of a population 
to embrace an insurance premium, is through willingness 
to pay studies [8–14]. Most times, premiums generated 
from WTP in low income countries are short of what can 
financially sustain such insurance schemes based on such 
premiums [15].
Since willingness to pay is also linked with affordability 
of the premium, some authors have also modelled hypo-
thetical scenarios that analysed affordability of premi-
ums at different thresholds. Schmidt, Mayindo and Kalk 
[15] in their study of determining how much Rwanda’s 
population should pay for CBHI, modelled various and 
increasing household membership fees in order to pre-
dict the percentage of the population excluded from 
CBHI. Based on the fee exceeding monthly income of the 
respective stratum, they determined the threshold pre-
mium (TP).
In this study, the threshold premium (TP) is being 
evaluated, which is, the maximum level of premium 
that a given proportion of the population covered by the 
scheme will be able to afford based on a pre-determined 
capacity to pay income. This study is therefore, meant to 
fill the existing gap in knowledge with respect to afford-
able premium and sustainable CBHI based on the afford-
able premium. The paper provides new knowledge on the 
threshold premium for a viable social health insurance 
scheme for the informal sector in Nigeria.
Conceptual framework
This study analyses affordability of CBHI premiums by 
determining households’ capacity to pay for a set of flat 
rate premiums of hypothetical CBHI schemes, and also 
models the likely impact of such premiums on member-
ship of these schemes.
The capacity to pay (CP), is defined here as 40  % of 
the annual non-food expenditure of the households 
in line with the recommendation of the World Health 
Organisation [16], and is estimated for households 
categorised in various geographic groups, and socio-
economic status quintiles. The capacity to pay amount 
is equivalent to the amount, if exceeded, is regarded to 
result to catastrophic medical expenditure [16–19]. For 
this study, catastrophic medical expenditure is said to 
occur when a “household must reduce its expenditures 
over a period of time to cope with health costs, although 
no consensus is available on the threshold proportion of 
household expenditure” [16].
Though there has not been consensus on what per-
centage of non-food expenditure should be regarded 
as catastrophic medical expenditure, a range of values 
have been proposed by experts in literature. (I.e. 5–40 %) 
[16–22]. In Nigeria, private funding for Medicare is 
more than 90 % [23]. More than 70 % of the population 
live below $1 a day [24] and prepayment mechanism for 
pooling risk is lacking [23]. Adopting the threshold of 
40  % for catastrophic medical expenditure showed that 
14.8  % of households studied in South Eastern Nige-
ria [24] and 15 % of households studied in urban South 
Eastern Nigeria were affected [25]. Both studies showed 
that the lowest socio economic quintile were most 
affected. Since, most studies done in Nigeria on cata-
strophic medical expenditure based on the maximum 
value of 40 % showed that the lowest SES was affected, 
we adopted this threshold in determining capacity to 
pay [26]. Non-food consumption expenditure is used as 
proxy to income because it is sensitive; information on 
income are not easily and accurately declared in African 
countries [23].
Achieving total health insurance coverage should be 
the objective of policy makers and the government. In 
our context whereby health insurance for the informal 
sector has not been properly established, we assumed 
that as part of the initial protocol for implementation, 
government will be willing to cover at least 80 % of the 
population. Since government as part of her civic respon-
sibility will make provision in the budget annually for the 
health sector,
We assumed that money generated by insurance 
schemes will be augmented by the budget of Ministry of 
Health.
Methods
Study setting, data and sampling approach
Data for this study is a revised general household sur-
vey panel (GHS-Panel) fielded by the National bureau of 
statistics in conjunction with the World bank in Nigeria 
between 2010 and 2011 [16].
The sample is designed to be representative at the 
national level as well as at the zonal (urban and rural) 
level. The sample is a two-stage probability sample:
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First stage The Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) were the 
Enumeration Areas (EAs). These were selected based on 
probability proportional to size (PPS) of the total EAs in 
each state and Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja 
and the total households listed in those EAs. A total of 
500 EAs were selected using this method.
Second stage The second stage was the selection of house-
holds. Households were selected randomly using the sys-
tematic selection of ten (10) households per EA. This 
involved obtaining the total number of households listed 
in a particular EA, and then calculating a sampling interval 
(SI) by dividing the total households listed by ten (10).
The next step was to generate a random start ‘r’ from 
the table of random numbers which stands as the 1st 
selection. Consecutive selection of households was 
obtained by adding the sampling interval to the random 
start. Determination of the sample size at the household 
level was based on the experience gained from previous 
rounds of the GHS, in which 10 households per EA are 
usually selected and give robust estimates.
In all, 500 clusters/EAs were canvassed and 5000 
households were interviewed. These samples were pro-
portionally selected in the states such that different states 
had different samples sizes. The distribution of the sam-
ples are shown in Table 1 below which shows the size of 
the sample in each state, by geopolitical zone and urban/
rural break-out. Households were not selected using 
replacement; thus the final number of household inter-
viewed was slightly less than the 5000 eligible for inter-
viewing. A total of 27,993 household members were 
interviewed. On the average about 4–6 all adult mem-
bers per house hold. Thus the final number of households 
with data in both points of time (post-planting and post-
harvest) is 4851 for a non-response rate of 0.3 percent.
The survey covered a wide range of topics which were 
collected via three different questionnaires administered 
to the household and the community. These were a house-
hold questionnaire, an agricultural questionnaire and a 
community questionnaire. The questionnaire obtained 
information on socio-economic and demographic charac-
teristics of households, labour and use of time, expendi-
ture on education, health, food and non-food items, 
household non-farm income-generating activities, assets, 
and use of information and communication technology.
Study design
The study was designed to present various scenario for 
estimation of affordability of premiums, and to use infor-
mation from the data sources to model the threshold pre-
mium. It also modelled the capacity to pay premium of 
households based on 40 % of their annual total non-food 
expenditure (Table 2).
For this study we modelled the effects of premium on 
the populations’ CP, for different rolled-out national and 
regional health insurance schemes. Several scenarios 
were considered. The national and regional schemes were 
considered, since most WTP studies in Nigeria were con-
ducted at state levels and so many states in the Northern 
region have not had any WTP study conducted for them.
Scenario 1 The proportion of the population able to 
afford different models of CBHI premiums (generated in 
the multiples of five, ranging from US$0–US$140) based 
on their ‘capacity to pay’ income. The choice of the range 
of premium was based on findings from WTP studies in 
Nigeria [12, 14, 17].
Scenario 2 A hypothetical national insurance scheme to 
cover the whole population in the informal sector was 
postulated. It was further differentiated into:
National rural insurance scheme: This scheme should 
cover only the rural population in the nation.
National urban insurance scheme: This should cover only 
the urban population in the nation.
Scenario 3 Hypothetical regional health insurance 
schemes to cover the six different regions in Nigeria were 
considered.
These include:
The North-central insurance scheme: Such a scheme is 
defined as covering the population in the North-central 
region. Therefore, TP would be based on the CP of the 
population within the region.
The North-east insurance scheme: Such a scheme is 
defined as covering the population in the North-east 
region. Therefore, TP would be based on the CP of the 
population within the region.
The North-west insurance scheme: Such a scheme is 
defined as covering the population in the North-west 
region. Therefore, TP would be based on the CP of the 
population within the region.
The South-east insurance scheme: Such a scheme is 
defined as covering the population in the South-east 
region. Therefore, TP would be based on the CP of the 
population within the region.
The South-west scheme: Such a scheme is defined as 
covering the population in the South-west region. There-
fore, TP would be based on the CP of the population 
within the region.
The South-south insurance scheme: Such a scheme is 
defined as covering the population in the South-south 
region. Therefore, TP would be based on the CP of the 
population within the region.
Scenario 4 Hypothetical regional schemes divided into 
North and South insurance schemes with a political bias 
in favour of the north. The political biased North insur-
ance scheme will cover all the three northern geopolitical 
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zones while the politically biased south insurance scheme 
will cover all the three southern geo-political zones. TP 
would be based on the CP of the populations covered by 
these schemes. The bias in this scheme is that effort is 
being made to cover a larger proportion of the popula-
tion in the North which is considered to have a greater 
population of population in the lowest socio economic 
quintile at the expense of the southern regions.
Under scenario I: the threshold premium is assumed to 
be:
P1 = threshold premium that will be afforded by 80 % 
of the population in the informal sector.
Table 1 Distribution of final sample of 500 EAs and 5000 households for panel survey by State, urban and rural sectors, 
within each zone
EAs enumeration areas; Hhs households
State Total Urban Rural
No. EAs No. Hhs No. EAs No. Hhs No. Hhs No. EAs
North central zone Benue 16 160 2 20 14 140
Kogi 12 120 4 40 8 80
Kwara 12 120 6 60 6 60
Nassarawa 7 70 1 10 6 60
Niger 18 180 4 40 14 140
Plateau 11 110 2 20 9 90
FCT Abuja 4 40 3 30 1 10
North-east zone Adamawa 12 120 1 10 11 110
Bauchi 17 170 3 30 14 140
Borno 21 210 5 50 16 160
Gombe 8 80 1 10 7 70
Taraba 9 90 0 0 9 90
Yobe 13 130 3 30 10 100
North-west zone Jigawa 13 130 2 20 11 110
Kaduna 12 120 4 40 8 80
Kano 20 200 3 30 17 170
Katsina 18 180 3 30 15 150
Kebbi 10 100 1 10 9 90
Sokoto 8 80 2 20 6 60
Zamfara 9 90 2 20 7 70
South-east zone Abia 11 110 4 40 7 70
Anambra 22 220 12 120 10 100
Ebonyi 14 140 1 10 13 130
Enugu 14 140 3 30 11 110
Imo 19 190 2 20 17 170
South–south zone Akwa-ibom 15 150 4 40 11 110
Bayelsa 7 70 1 10 6 60
Cross River 13 130 3 30 10 100
Delta 14 140 4 40 10 100
Edo 10 100 5 50 5 50
Rivers 21 210 8 80 13 130
South-west zone Ekiti 8 80 6 60 2 20
Lagos 17 170 16 160 1 10
Ogun 11 110 7 70 4 40
Ondo 13 130 6 60 7 70
Osun 18 180 14 140 4 40
Oyo 23 230 15 150 8 80
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Under scenario 2: the threshold premium is assumed to 
be:
P2  =  threshold premium that will be afforded by 
80 % of the population within the urban and rural areas 
respectively.
Under scenario 3: the threshold premium is assumed to 
be:
P3 = threshold premium that will be afforded by 80 % 
of the population within each region.
Under scenario 4: the threshold premium is: is assumed 
to be:
P4  =  threshold premium that will be afforded by 90 
and 70 % of the population within the North and South 
regions of Nigeria respective
Data analysis
Calculating Insurance coverage. Assuming that the whole 
population of Nigeria was P and the population for the 
six regions were P1, P2, P3, P4, P5 and P6 respectively.
Also, if government seeks to cover 80 % of the popula-
tion in order to achieve universal coverage, the popula-
tion covered will be expressed mathematically as:
0.8p = x1p1+ x2p2+ x3p3+ x4p4 + x5p5+ x6p6; 
where xi represents the proportion of population from 
region i covered by the insurance. In a simplest and most 
equal form, which we model first (i.e. scenario 1—see 
above), all xi are equal to 80  %. But alternative cover-
age options are possible where coverage will be different 
from one region to another.
Calculating capacity to pay income. The capacity to pay 
of households is defined as:
where ExpNF is the total expenditures spent by a house-
hold on non-food products.
Based on the CP, the households in the study were 
arranged in descending order and the percentile with 
CP = ExpNF × 40%
confidence interval calculated. The 20th percentile was 
used except in the case of politically- biased North and 
South schemes in which 10th and 30th percentile were 
used respectively. The values gotten following the calcu-
lation of percentile using the 20th percentile (10th and 
30th percentiles for politically biased schemes) were 
regarded as the TPs for the different schemes in question.
Calculating insurance financial sustainability. Maxi-
mum income generated by Insurance scheme is defined 
as:
where TP is the threshold premium per household; HH is 
number of households covered by scheme.
Therefore income generated per person by insurance 
scheme is defined as:
where P x is the total population covered by the scheme.
An assumption was made that the money generated 
from each scheme would be augmented by the annual 
funds transfer to the ministry of health (MOH) by the 
federal government.
Therefore, Revenue budgeted per person by MOH is 
defined as:
where T rev is the total budget to MOH and P is the total 
population of the nation.
Therefore, total income generated per person by each 
scheme following funds transfer from MOH is defined as:
where I per is income generated per person by insurance 
scheme and R per is revenue budgeted per person by 
MOH.
Data analysis was done using STATA 12 and Microsoft 
excel 2007 spread sheet
Currency Conversion rate used in the study: 155.73 
Naira = US$ 1 [18].
Results
Descriptive characteristics of all respondents
About 68.31 % of the respondents in this study were liv-
ing in rural area. Half of these respondents (50.1 %) were 
women.
The average age of the respondents were 23  years for 
both urban and rural population. The average annual 
total expenditure of households was 486,867 Naira (US$ 
3126). Maximum annual average expenditure on health 
constitutes 6 and 18  % of average total and non-food 
expenditures respectively.
Max − Tinc = TP ×HH
Iper = Max − Tinc/Px
Rper = Trev/P
Tincome = Iper + Rper
Table 2 An overview of  different models of  hypothetical 
schemes
Scenarios Hypothetical health  
insurance schemes
Coverage
2 National health insurance scheme The whole  
population
2A National rural health insurance scheme The whole rural 
population
2B National urban health insurance scheme The whole urban 
population
3 Regional health insurance schemes The six different 
regions
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Expendable income for population strata
Table  3 summarizes mean capacity to pay categorized 
in quintiles used in analysis. Average CP ranged from 
12,267–124,576 Naira (US$79–US$800). The highest CP 
was seen in 5th quintile of South-west zone while the 
lowest was in 1st quintile of North-west zone. The CP 
increased along quintiles for all zones. There appears 
to be variation in statistical difference in average CP 
between urban and rural sectors in the different zones. 
The north central and North West zones showed con-
sistently, a significant statistical difference in average CP 
between urban and rural sectors across quintiles.
Modelling the likely impact of different CBHI fee structure 
on capacity to pay premium across quintiles
Figure 1 shows the linear relationship between premium 
levels and ability to afford premium. Sixty percent of the 
population could afford premium at US$60 annual pre-
mium irrespective of the quintile. However, beyond that 
level, there was a marked reduction of the population 
within the 1st quintile who could afford premium. Only 
22  % of 1st quintile could afford premium of US$140 
compared to 69 % in 5Th quintile.
At premium US$25, 80 % of the population within 1st 
quintile had the capacity to afford. There is an interest-
ing overlap between 3rd and 4th quintile with respect to 
CP. Of all quintile the 1st quintile was affected most when 
premium exceeded US$60 (marked divergence of line in 
the graph).
The threshold premium for rural and urban households 
in different Health Insurance Schemes
Table 4 shows that the 95 % confidence interval of all pre-
dicted TPs was within a narrow range and above zero. 
This gave the range that truly contains the actual popu-
lation value. The politically biased scheme in favour of 
the northern part of the country generated a TP of 4562 
Naira (US$29). This is about five times less than the TP 
of the politically biased south health insurance scheme 
(US$144).
It is of interest to note that though most regional 
schemes gave rise to TPs less than US$75, it was not 
Table 3 The capacity to pay across zones categorized in quintiles
A urban sector; B rural sector; P p value
* P < 0.05 statistically significant
SES quintiles Mean capacity to pay in Naira categorized in SES quintiles ± SD
1 2 3 4 5
North-central
 A 30,271 ± 15,577 41,039 ± 25,855 50,911 ± 32,154 70,288 ± 49,888 111,032 ± 101,971
 B 101,971 ± 12,683 24,123 ± 20,470 30,488 ± 26,157 45,772 ± 45,092 78,297 ± 91,154
 P <0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.002* 0.010*
North-east
 A 42,757 ± 53,440 30,248 ± 19,899 54,103 ± 40,784 57,864 ± 49,689 122,532 ± 185,815
 B 13,786 ± 11,972 21,814 ± 20,334 37,577 ± 41,139 42,179 ± 41,609 74,570 ± 163,508
 P <0.001* 0.070 0.03 0.11 0.16
North west
 A 22,940 ± 13,782 33,551 ± 17,621 44,386 ± 35,952 52,455 ± 39,918 106,459 ± 107,559
 B 11,368 ± 9244 17,844 ± 14,364 23,657 ± 20,842 33,355 ± 32,702 79,712 ± 144,794
 P <0.001* <0.001* <0.001* 0.005* 0.200
South east
 A 18,857 ± 14,946 24,784 ± 19,492 42,265 ± 37,335 56,996 ± 38,748 124,453 ± 114,897
 B 16,106 ± 11,394 27,407 ± 18,227 32,613 ± 30,002 45,717 ± 38,821 68,182 ± 76,704
 P 0.640 0.560 0.190 0.070 <0.001*
South–south
 A 22,388 ± 14,326 37,875 ± 23,783 40,057 ± 29,574 57,697 ± 41,776 142,574 ± 175,612
 B 15,035 ± 11,826 29,522 ± 28,056 25,055 ± 21,448 37,964 ± 42,617 59,107 ± 130,511
 P 0.060 0.130 0.005* 0.003* <0.001*
South west
 A 24,785 ± 13,106 27,670 ± 16,954 53,637 ± 34,087 82,176 ± 55,001 153,558 ± 141,306
 B 18,671 ± 12,859 26,345 ± 19,631 41,802 ± 27,930 55,811 ± 45,847 88,019 ± 101,698
 P 0.140 0.820 0.08 <0.001* <0.001*
Page 7 of 13Udeh et al. BMC Res Notes  (2016) 9:383 
same for both the south-west and south–south regional 
schemes which exceeded TPs of US$108.
Moreover, the national urban insurance scheme TP was 
three times higher than the national rural TP. The TP for 
the national insurance scheme appears to be equivalent 
to the least regional scheme TPs and the rural national 
insurance TP.
However, it is relevant to note the impact of these TPs 
on the proportion of the population able to afford them 
across quintiles. Figure 2 shows that 55 % of the popula-
tion in 1st quintile could afford the TPs for the national 
insurance scheme compared to 91.5 % of those in the 5th 
quintile. Compared to the proposed national premium 
by NHIS, more individuals in the 1st quintile were able 
to afford the TP than the proposed national premium. 
Though this difference reflected across all quintiles, it 
was more marked in the 1st quintile.
There was a gradual rise in the mean CP across the 
quintiles. The population in the 1st quintile had the low-
est mean CP which was below 20,000 naira per annum.
Figure  3 shows that the proportion of the population 
in the 1st quintile that could afford TP was least in the 
politically biased south scheme. The TP of the politically 
biased north scheme (80  %) was the most affordable by 
those in the 1st quintile followed by the rural national 
scheme (60 %).
Figure  4 shows the proportion of the population 
that can afford TP based on regional health insurance 



































Fig. 1 Proportion of population who could afford CBHI premium 
level
Table 4 The threshold premium that households would be able to pay for the schemes
155.73 Naira = US$1 [18]











North-central regional 9694 (62) 8526–11,096 80 788
North-east regional 7979 (51) 6894–8684 80 793
North-west regional 6804 (44) 6230–7700 80 892
South-east regional 11,222 (72) 9,9745–13,903 80 792
South-west regional 18,815 (120.82) 16,326–21,316 80 754
South-south regional 16,908 (109) 15,103–18,232 80 1528
National urban 23,905 (154) 21,483–25,693 80 1528
National rural 8218 (53) 7757–8699 80 3371
National 10,303 (66) 9862–10,851 80 4845
Politically-biased (north) 4562.48 (29) 4200–4873 90 2473







































































Mean capacity to pay
income
Fig. 2 Proportion of the population who can afford premium based 
on national scheme categorized in quintiles
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proportion of the population in 1st quintile able to afford 
the TP of the South-south regional scheme was the least 
(39 %). Three regional TPs were affordable by 60 % of the 
population within the 1st quintile namely north-central, 
north-east and north-west. Importantly, it should be 
noted that the proportion of the population within the 
1st quintile who could afford TPs of regional schemes in 
the south were not up to 60 %.
Compared with the TP of the national scheme, only 
three regional schemes had similar effect on the popu-
lation in the lowest quintiles ability to afford while the 
rest had worse effect. The variation in effect of the dif-
ferent regional schemes compared to the national scheme 
implies that the regional schemes may be more favour-
able to the lowest quintiles in some regions than in oth-
ers; raising the issue of equity.
The financial sustainability of the various schemes based 
on affordability threshold premium
Table  5 shows the financial sustainability of the various 
schemes based on TPs and funds transferred to minis-
try of health by the Federal Government of Nigeria. The 
approved budget for the ministry of health in 2011 was 
235,866,483,244 Naira (US$1,742,624,949) [19]. With an 
estimated population of 150,589,000 [20], the budget per 
capita is about US$10. Therefore, the supplementary rev-
enue that will be generated by each scheme based on the 
assumption of six persons per household [12] is shown in 
the Table 4 below:
In order to achieve excellent comparison between 
income generated by health insurance scheme and the 
budget per capita of MOH, the revenue generated was 
calculated per person. The assumption being that on the 
average, six individuals make up a household. This was 
the finding from this study and is supported by a simi-
lar conclusion in a study done by Fonta, Eme Ichoku and 
Ataguba [12] while determining WTP among individuals 
in Nsukka Local government of Nigeria.
For the regional schemes, the South-west regional 
health insurance scheme generated the highest revenue 
followed by the South-south regional health insurance 
scheme. The least revenue was generated by the North-
west regional health insurance scheme. Interestingly, the 
South-south and South-west regional health insurance 
schemes have the highest TP but the health insurance 
schemes in the North have the lowest TPs as well as low-
est generated revenue.
The urban national insurance scheme generated more 
funds than the rural national insurance scheme.
Adopting the regional health schemes to cover the 
whole nation will generate a summative fund of US$13 
per individual while a national health scheme will gen-
erate a total fund of US$11 per individual per annum. 







































Fig. 3 Proportion of the population who can afford premium based on National-based schemes categorized in socio-economic quintiles
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per capita of MOH) to these schemes will result in 
total funds generated to be US$23 and US$21 per per-
son per annum for both regional and national schemes 
respectively.
Discussion
The mean capacity to pay for the households in different 
regions ranged from 30,271 ± 15,577 (US$194 ± 100) to 
153,558.2  ±  141,306 Naira (US$986  ±  907). There was 
reduction in the capacity to afford premium as premium 
increased. This effect was much remarkable in the lowest 
SES quintile. About sixty percent of the population could 
afford premium at US$60 annual premium irrespective 
of the quintile. The threshold premiums of the national 
health insurance scheme, urban national health insur-
ance and rural health insurance schemes were US$66, 
US$154 and US$53 respectively.
Invariably, CP reduced significantly across socio eco-
nomic quintile as revealed in the study. It was not sur-
prising then that affordability of premium, reduced as the 
CBHI premium increased and the effect was worst on the 












































Fig. 4 Proportion of the population who can afford premium based on regional health schemes categorized in socio-economic quintiles
Table 5 Showing income generated per individual for each 
scheme following Ministry of health funds transfer











Urban 50,147,000 154 36 10
Rural 100,442,000 53 19 10
Political-
north
81,237,000 29 15 10
Political-
south
69,353,000 144 34 10




21,971,000 62 20 10
 North east 20,353,000 51 19 10
 North west 38,913,000 44 17 10
 South east 17,430,000 72 22 10
 South west 29,594,000 121 30 10
 South–
south
22,329,000 109 28 10
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that at premium above US$60, only 40 % of the popula-
tion in the lowest socio economic quintile could afford 
premium. These results confirm the linear relationship 
between ability to afford premium and socio economic 
status which agrees with similar findings by some experts 
[3, 9, 10, 21, 22]. Importantly, this study showed that high 
premium has worst effect on the first (lowest) quintile 
implying that adopting higher premium(above US$60) in 
insurance schemes will lead to low enrolment and dispro-
portionately affect the poorest in the Nigerian society.
The results of different hypothetical schemes consid-
ered in this study both at national and regional levels 
showed that the rural national health scheme appeared to 
favour the lowest quintile of the population by generating 
a lower TP which was affordable to 60  % of population 
in the lowest quintile compared to 48  % for the urban 
national health insurance scheme.
This allows the conclusion that separating the national 
health insurance scheme into rural and urban will pos-
sibly improve affordability of premium by rural dwellers 
who are mainly in the lowest socio economic quintile. 
Most experts [6, 23–25] agree that national or regional 
health insurance schemes achieve substantial coverage 
of the population compared to multiple voluntary based 
community based health insurance schemes.
However, this study does not support adopting TP for 
regional health insurance schemes because it favours 
the lowest socio economic groups in some regions at the 
expense of other regions (for example TP of North-west 
regional scheme was more affordable to the lowest socio 
economic quintile compared to South-south regional 
scheme). This differential effect may be counterproduc-
tive if equitable distribution of health services is to be 
achieved. In this respect, adopting the National rural 
health insurance scheme whose TP achieves horizontal 
equity (individuals within the same quintile pay same 
premium irrespective of their region) across lowest socio 
economic quintiles in different regions (in Nigeria) may 
be the best alternative.
From a wider perspective, this study provides evidence 
that premium generated from WTP studies are lower 
than the TPs from this study. This confirms earlier claims 
by some experts [26, 27] that premiums calculated from 
WTP are not true reflections of what a given population 
can afford therefore, do not generate optimal revenue for 
insurance schemes. For instance, the WTP study in the 
South-east region generated a premium of about US$34.8 
[14] whilst TP for a Southeast regional scheme based on 
this study is US$72.06 (about twice WTP).
The observed difference in premium may be due to 
the low literacy level among rural dwellers in Nigeria. It 
might be difficult for them to appreciate the magnitude 
of their health challenges weighed against other priorities 
competing for their income. As such, they may not make 
rational decisions in the choice of what they are willing 
to pay.
TP determines affordability and not willingness to pay. 
However, the essence of determining TP is not for pol-
icy makers to adopt it as the premium but for premium 
adopted not to exceed the TP. For instance the premium 
currently being advocated for CBHI in Nigeria exceeded 
the TP. If premium is based on WTP and in such cases 
usually lower than TP, it will be acceptable as long as gov-
ernment is willing to augment it so that the schemes are 
viable.
With respect to equity, it could be argued that adopt-
ing TP as against WTP generated premium may be very 
regressive to the poor. This was not the case in this study. 
Adopting hypothetical rural national health insurance 
scheme showed that about 60 % of the population in the 
lowest socio economic status (first quintile) were able to 
afford TP. Yet, TP generated was greater than all premi-
ums generated by WTP studies in Nigeria [12, 14, 17, 28].
From the perspective of financial sustainability of the 
various health insurance schemes considered, it is quite 
instrumental to relate the estimate of minimum spend-
ing per person per year needed to provide basic lifesaving 
services as recommended by WHO (US$35–US$50 per 
person per year) [29] to funds generated by health insur-
ance schemes.
Depending only on budget provision to the ministry 
of health will imply realising only a third of the recom-
mended minimum spending as revealed by the study. This 
is further complicated by the fluctuation of fund transfer 
from the government depending on the priorities of gov-
ernment and the income generated [30]. Consequently, 
the health sector will be underfunded if it depends solely 
on government funding. However, including either the 
regional or national schemes will result in generation of 
additional funds within the range of US$11–US$13 per 
person per year. This can only be possible if premium is 
based on TP and not WTP and also if the health insur-
ance schemes are made compulsory. Most WTP studies 
[12, 23, 25, 31] conducted in Nigeria generated very low 
premiums and were based on voluntary membership of 
the schemes. Implicitly, from the financial perspective, 
lot of funds will be lost if premium based on WTP were 
to be used for the health insurance schemes.
However, despite the predicted income that will be 
generated based on TP, it is still lower than what is rec-
ommended by the WHO. Considering that premium 
predicted is based on maximum premium that can be 
affordable by the population (if 80 % were to be covered), 
increasing premium beyond this threshold will exclude 
the lowest socioeconomic groups from membership of 
the hypothetical insurance schemes.
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Remarkably, the lowest socio economic groups form 
the bulk of the rural dwellers, as such increasing the pre-
mium beyond the TP will result in low enrolment of the 
rural dwellers. Considering that in Nigeria rural dwellers 
constitute the bulk of the informal sector [16], it becomes 
imperative to be discretionary in adopting premium for 
the informal sector.
However, from the perspective of maximising coverage, 
it appears more appropriate for policy makers to adopt 
the scheme that will be affordable for a greater propor-
tion of the least socioeconomic class in the rural areas if 
premium is based on the predicted TP.
If the interest is to achieve maximal coverage of the 
rural dwellers then, the rural national health insurance 
scheme is most appropriate; but if achieving maximal 
coverage of the informal sector is the priority then a 
national health insurance scheme will be most ideal.
Limitations of the study
The limitations of the study was grouped into limitations 
of the data and limitations of the methods. An observed 
limitation in the data is the presumed measurement 
errors in the data collected for non-food expenditure. 
The data was collected in the post-harvest seasons and 
no provision was made for repeated collection of data in 
other parts of the year to allow for calculation of reliabil-
ity ratios [32].
Considering that income fluctuation is the norm for 
rural dwellers in the country who are mainly subsistence 
farmers; Validity of outcome could be improved if data 
on non-food expenditure during the pre-planting season 
was available.
Another limitation was that data collection was in 2011, 
as such; there may be variations in the current capacity to 
pay of the population due to changes in economic indi-
ces. A current data on expenditure on non-food will have 
improved the validity of the results.
The limitations of method were in the assump-
tions made in order to model the TPs for the different 
schemes which may not be perfectly ideal in practice. 
These include assuming that all households will enrol 
into the scheme and that government will be willing 
to cover 80  % of the population. These assumptions 
will only be feasible if a compulsory scheme is adopted 
and policy makers are willing to cover 80  % of the 
population.
Next, was the use of percentile in generating TP which 
should have high validity if the distribution was perfectly 
normal. This is usually not the case in population sur-
veys; however to mitigate this, confidence intervals were 




The results buttress the opinion of certain authors [15, 
33] on the capacity of TP to increase the finances gen-
erated by health insurance schemes compared to WTP. 
It appears that the current national premium being pro-
posed by NHIS exceeded the premiums generated by 
WTP studies. Unfortunately, the proposed premium for 
the informal sector national health insurance scheme 
also exceeded the threshold premium generated in this 
study (based on a hypothetical national health insur-
ance scheme). The implication being that payment of the 
NHIS proposed premium by certain individuals in the 
lowest socio economic class may be regarded as “cata-
strophic” apparently, in order to avoid untoward effect on 
membership of the lowest socio economic class, a review 
of the proposed premium is recommended.
Additionally, the findings in this study that the propor-
tion of lowest socioeconomic group able to afford TP for 
rural national health insurance scheme was higher than 
for both National and Urban national health insurance 
schemes implies that it may be worth considering sepa-
rating premium of rural social health insurance scheme 
from that of urban self-employed health insurance 
scheme such that each scheme has a different premium 
probably based on the predicted TP from this study con-
sidering that a sizeable proportion of the informal sector 
reside in the rural area.
Finally, policy makers should as a matter of urgency 
scale up the budget to MOH if universal coverage for 
basic lifesaving services will be achieved since additional 
funds based on TP is still not adequate.
Policy recommendation
The results from this study showed that the capacity to 
pay reduced across socioeconomic quintiles with the 
first quintile having the lowest. Also, the proportion of 
population able to afford premium reduced as premium 
increased. Effect was worse on the lowest socio economic 
class. Additionally, the different hypothetical health insur-
ance schemes considered in the study showed that the 
rural national health insurance scheme and the national 
insurance schemes generated a favourable TP for the poor 
rural dwellers. However, the regional schemes generated 
TPs which were not affordable by a large proportion of 
population in the lowest socioeconomic quintiles in cer-
tain regions. It was also demonstrated in the study that the 
NHIS proposed premium for the informal sector insur-
ance scheme was above the TP for a national scheme.
Furthermore, it was proven from the study that 
depending on TP will generate more funds from health 
schemes than using WTP. Also, both national and 
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regional schemes could not generate sufficient revenue to 
meet the WHO requirement for basic lifesaving services 
despite supplementation by MOH budget.
Consequently, the policy recommendations include 
re-evaluating NHIS proposed premium to reflect the 
threshold premium; since the current premium exceeded 
TP as well as increasing budgetary allocation to ministry 
of health, in order to achieve a financially viable health 
insurance scheme.
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